



September 5, 2025

The Honorable Pete Hegseth
U.S. Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable Sean Duffy
U.S. Secretary of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Ave, SE
Washington, DC 20590

Dear Secretary Hegseth and Secretary Duffy:

A broad coalition of industry groups from the satellite, business, aviation, maritime, automotive, and public safety communities wrote to you on September 5, 2025, requesting that your Departments work together to address immediate and growing threats to aviation and maritime safety and commerce from GPS signal jamming and spoofing. The GPS Innovation Alliance (GPSIA) was proud to play a leading role in that effort.

GPSIA promotes GPS, Global Navigation Satellite Systems, complementary space-based position, navigation, and timing systems, components, products, services, and their receivers and devices. We are firmly committed to protecting these technologies from harmful interference, including from jamming and spoofing.

GPSIA respectfully submits recommendations (Tab A) that outline how the Trump Administration can solve jamming and spoofing threats affecting the transportation industry and commerce through a “whole of government” approach. We stand ready to assist your teams and other departments and agencies in expeditiously addressing these challenges.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

//signed//

Lisa L. Dyer
Executive Director
GPS Innovation Alliance
(571) 335-3471
ldyer@gpsalliance.org

Tab A: GPSIA Recommendations: How the Trump Administration Can Solve Jamming and Spoofing Threats to Aviation and Maritime Safety and Commerce



cc:

The Honorable J.D. Vance, Vice President of the United States

The Honorable Marco Rubio, Secretary of State

The Honorable Howard Lutnick, Secretary of Commerce

The Honorable Kristi Noem, Secretary of Homeland Security

Mr. Russell Vought, Director of the Office of Management and Budget

Mr. Michael Kratsios,

Presidential Science Advisor and Director of Science and Technology Policy

The Honorable Marco Rubio (Acting), Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The Honorable Bryan Bedford, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration

The Honorable Brendan Carr, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission

The Honorable Anna Gomez, Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission

The Honorable Olivia Trusty, Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission

The Honorable Sean Duffy (Acting), National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Tab A – GPSIA Recommendations: How the Trump Administration Can Solve Jamming and Spoofing Threats to Aviation and Maritime Safety and Commerce

The GPS Innovation Alliance recommends executive branch departments and agencies take a “whole of government” approach and undertake actions outlined below to quell the impacts of jamming and spoofing of GPS to aviation and maritime operations and commerce outside of conflict zones. Near term actions include issuing public statements and conducting diplomatic activities to highlight actions of bad actors that are creating unnecessary risks to public safety and impeding commerce; improving regulatory, standards, and certification processes; and creating plans to enforce illegal marketing, sales, and operations of jammers and spoofers and to deter bad actors. Technology upgrades that increase GPS resiliency to jamming and spoofing should be achieved within four years. It is important for government and industry to continue ongoing work to identify viable commercial complementary positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) systems, recognizing that such systems require time to mature and be deployed across the national and international airspace and waters. Their signals need to be tested and certified as safe for public safety applications by regulators and made available for industry to evaluate whether to integrate them into receivers.

Specific actions that can be undertaken:

Identify and Appropriate Funding Necessary to Successfully Execute the Actions Outlined Below

The President, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and Congress are key partners to ensure funding is available to departments and agencies.

Use Public Statements and Diplomatic Activities to Serve as a Deterrent, Raise Awareness

The United States has not issued any public statements to date that expresses its concerns with jamming and spoofing occurring outside of combat zones.

- Issue public statements condemning jamming and spoofing outside of conflict zones and highlight the importance of maintaining global commitments to safe passenger transportation.
- Inform the International Civil Aviation Organization that the United States is committed to providing modern civil GPS signals for performance-based navigation in international airspace. This action can inform Council and Navigation Systems Panel deliberations and activities undertaken to implement their “dual-frequency, multi-constellation” counter jamming/spoofing initiative.
- Encourage ICAO to continue prioritizing Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) protections and to standardize interference/spoofing reporting (radio calls and Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) reports).

Continue to Improve Regulatory, Procedural, and Certification Processes

- Immediately publish in the Federal Register export control reforms to enable greater use of jam- and spoof-resistant Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas (CRPAs) for PNT, which would result in these items being moved from the International Traffic in Arms Regulation to the Export Administration Regulation (“EAR 99”).
- Streamline processes, orders, and regulations that would enable the integration of:
 - advanced CRPA antennas into aircraft;
 - the modern GPS aviation signal “L5” into aviation certified receivers.
- Streamline processes, orders, and regulations that would enable anti-spoofing signal authentication into aviation-certified receivers.
- Continue to accelerate implementation of the Performance-based Operations Aviation Rulemaking Committee’s *Recommendations for Continuity of Operations During a GPS Disruption Event*.

Continue to Conduct Enforcement Actions and Create Plans to Increase Awareness of and Counter and Deter Jamming and Spoofing that Impact Public Safety and Commercial Activities

- Establish an interagency task force or analytic cell with individuals that possess sufficient seniority and expertise to ensure the rapid and effective identification, dissemination, and coordination of GPS spoofing and jamming events, which can issue timely notifications and warnings to civil aviation, maritime, and other stakeholders.
- Continue to increase customs inspections to identify and confiscate foreign-made signal jammers and spoofers destined for import into the United States.
- Draft a plan that prioritizes enforcement against illegal operations, marketing, and sales of jamming and spoofing equipment no later than January 2026.
- Establish as a top priority (“Tier 1”) intelligence collection and analysis of intentional jamming and spoofing of commercial aircraft and ships by foreign individuals, groups and entities and share this information with commercial operators at the speed of relevance.
- Enhance and accelerate information sharing between the military and civil agencies including incident reporting, threat assessments, radio frequency interference data sharing, and research and development analysis.
- Allow civil operators to participate and request GPS interference conference calls.

Technology Upgrades Can Preserve GPS Integrity for the NAS and Maritime Operations

- Launch and operate two orbit-ready GPS III satellites no later than March 2026 to increase the numbers of satellites transmitting the modern “L5” aviation signal and deliver greater anti-jamming capabilities to military users.
- Procure 10 additional GPS IIIF satellites no later than September 2029. Launch and operate 12 GPS IIIF satellites by September 2030 make it possible for the FAA to declare the “L5” signal “fully operational” and available for use in aviation, deliver greater anti-jamming capabilities to military users, and eliminate “single string” GPS satellite vulnerabilities.
- Accelerate upgrades to the GPS ground station (“operational control segment”) so that it can monitor the integrity, health, and wellness of the “L5” signal and command and control GPS IIIF satellites no later than March 2027.
- Equip the GPS III and IIIF satellites and future GPS satellites to transmit anti-spoofing authentication signals no later than February 2029.
- Equip the GPS operational control segment to monitor anti-spoofing authentication signals no later than February 2029.
- Invest in technology to improve GPS interference and spoofing detection.
- Implement signal authentication capabilities for WAAS signals.
- Develop budgetary and engineering roadmaps that upon implementation would ensure GPS and follow-on systems are technologically more advanced than the PRC’s BeiDou and Europe’s Galileo systems.